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Abstract—We present the design and implementation of a
tool called TASE that uses transactional memory to reduce the
latency of symbolic-execution applications with small amounts
of symbolic state. Execution paths are executed natively while
operating on concrete values, and only when execution encoun-
ters symbolic values (or modeled functions) is native execution
suspended and interpretation begun. Execution then returns to
its native mode when symbolic values are no longer encountered.
The key innovations in the design of TASE are a technique for
amortizing the cost of checking whether values are symbolic over
few instructions, and the use of hardware-supported transactional
memory (TSX) to implement native execution that rolls back
with no effect when use of a symbolic value is detected (perhaps
belatedly). We show that TASE has the potential to dramatically
improve some latency-sensitive applications of symbolic execu-
tion, such as methods to verify the behavior of a client in a
client-server application.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its introduction [5], [22], symbolic execution has
found myriad applications for security analysis and defense
(e.g., [24], [6], [8], [38], [16], [37], [26], [33], [30], [43]),
software testing (e.g., [36], [19], [31], [35], [1], [29], [20], [9]),
and debugging (e.g., [42], [40]). Whereas regular, “concrete”
execution of a program maintains a specific value for each
variable, symbolic execution allows some “symbolic” variables
to be undetermined but possibly constrained (e.g., to be in
some range). Upon reaching a branch condition involving a
symbolic variable, each branch is executed under the constraint
on the symbolic variable implied by having taken that branch.
Any execution path thus explored yields a set of constraints
on the symbolic variables implied by having taken that path.
In an example use case, these constraints could be provided to
an SMT solver [27] to compute a concrete assignment to the
symbolic inputs that would cause that path to be executed.
When applied to testing, the speed of symbolic execution
is typically a secondary concern. However, several security
applications place symbolic execution on the critical path of
defensive response in time-critical circumstances. For exam-
ple, some works (e.g., [6], [16]) leverage symbolic execution
to generate vulnerability signatures upon detecting an exploit
attempt, and so the speed of symbolic execution is a limiting
factor in the speed with which vulnerability signatures can
be created and deployed to other sites. Other examples are
intrusion-detection systems in which a server-side verifier
symbolically executes a client program to find an execution
path that is consistent with messages received from the client,
without knowing all inputs driving the client (e.g., [15], [12]).
If each message could be verified before delivering it to
the server, then the server would be protected from exploit
traffic that a legitimate client would not send (e.g., Heartbleed
packets to an OpenSSL server [12]). However, such tools are
not yet fast enough to perform this checking on the critical
path of delivering messages to the server, reducing them to
detecting exploits alongside server processing.
Conventional wisdom holds that SMT solving and state
explosion are the primary latency bottlenecks in symbolic
execution. However, the speed of straightline, concrete ex-
ecution has been found to be the primary culprit in some
contexts (e.g., [15], [41]). Most symbolic execution tools incur
a substantial performance penalty to straightline execution
because they interpret the program under analysis, even when
it is performing operations on concrete data. For example, Yun
et al. [41] report straightline-execution overheads of 3000×
and 321,000× native execution speed for KLEE [7] and
angr [33], due to interpretation. The need to interpret the
program in these tools arises from the need to track sym-
bolic variables, to accumulate constraints on those variables
along each execution path, and to explore multiple execution
paths. Even attempts to optimize symbolic execution when
processing only instructions with concrete arguments must
typically incur overheads due to lightweight interpretation;
e.g., S2E [14] encounters an overhead of roughly 6× vanilla
QEMU [2] execution speed on purely concrete data due its
use of memory sharing between QEMU and KLEE.
In this paper, we provide a solution that supports fast native
execution of instructions with concrete values—while still
using interpretation to do the “symbolic parts” of symbolic
execution—on modern x86 platforms. Our design and asso-
ciated tool, called TASE1, accomplish this through two key
innovations. Though TASE instruments the executable to test
whether variables are concrete or symbolic (like EXE [8]), our
first innovation amortizes the costs of these tests by batching
many into a few instructions. To maximize the benefits of this
amortization, TASE defers these checks to ensure that only
variables actually used are checked; this deferment, together
with the amortization, means that instructions may be con-
cretely executed on symbolic variables. Therefore, a critical
second innovation in TASE is a way of rolling back such
erroneous computations so they have no effect. TASE uses
hardware transactions as supported by Intel TSX extensions
1TASE stands for “Transactional Acceleration for Symbolic Execution”.
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for this purpose, though as we will see, accomplishing with
low overhead is nontrivial.
This paper outlines the design of TASE, and evaluates
its potential to accelerate symbolic execution of applications
with small amounts of symbolic state. We first show where
TASE improves over modern alternatives such as KLEE and
S2E through a microbenchmark comparison. This comparison
shows that while TASE can perform poorly relative to these
alternatives for applications with large amounts of symbolic
data, it can perform much better than them when the amount
of symbolic data is small.
Second, we show how TASE qualitatively improves the
deployment options for a specific defensive technique, namely
behavioral verification of a client program [15], [12] as
introduced above. Though Chi et al. were able to show the
verification of OpenSSL client messages in TLS 1.2 sessions
induced by a Gmail workload at a speed that coarsely keeps
pace with these sessions [12], their verification was not fast
enough to perform on the critical path of message delivery.
We show that replacing the symbolic execution component
of their tool with TASE substantially improves the prospects
for performing verification as a condition of message delivery.
More specifically, we show that TASE’s optimizations reduce
the average, median, and maximum lag suffered by any client-
to-server message by over 80%, 94%, and 57%, where lag is
defined as the delay between arrival of a message to the verifier
and its delivery to the server after verification completes. In
doing so, TASE brings these lags into ranges that are practical
for performing inline verification of TLS sessions driven by
applications, like Gmail, that are paced by human activity.
To summarize, our contributions are as follows:
• We introduce a method to limit tests for determining
whether variables are symbolic to only those variables
that are actually used, and to batch many such tests into
few instructions. Since this deferred testing can result in
our erroneously executing instructions on symbolic data,
we show how transactional memory can be leveraged to
undo the effects of these erroneous computations.
• We detail the numerous optimizations necessary to realize
the promise of this approach, in terms of achieving com-
pelling performance improvements for some applications
of symbolic execution. We show through microbench-
mark tests where TASE outperforms modern alternatives,
KLEE and S2E.
• We show that TASE improves a specific defense using
symbolic execution, namely behavioral verification [15],
[12], to an extent that qualitatively improves how such a
defense can be deployed on TLS traffic. Specifically, we
show that TASE reduces the costs of this defense to per-
mit its application inline for all but very latency-sensitive
applications. In doing so, TASE enables preemptively
protecting the server from exploits using this approach,
versus its current ability to only detect malformed client
messages alongside their processing by the server.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We discuss
related work in Sec. II. We provide background and describe
challenges that we must overcome to realize TASE in Sec. III,
and present the design of TASE in Sec. IV. We discuss addi-
tional aspects of TASE’s implementation in Sec. V. Sec. VI
contains an evaluation of TASE for a symbolic execution-
based application, and microbenchmarks. We discuss limita-
tions of TASE in Sec. VII and conclude in Sec. VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we outline prior work on symbolic execution
systems similar to ours, and work using Intel’s Transactional
Synchronization Instructions.
A. Symbolic Execution Engines
Symbolic execution engines DART [19] and CUTE [31]
represent some of the earliest modern attempts to mix concrete
and symbolic execution [9]. Their approach, called concolic
testing, analyzes a program by choosing an initial set of
concrete input values V to a given program. The program
is then executed with instrumentation to determine when
control flow instructions are encountered, and constraints are
accumulated at these branch locations in terms of their relation
to the concrete inputs. After execution with input V terminates
or is suspended, the constraints gathered from execution on V
are analyzed to determine a new set of concrete inputs V ′ to
guide execution down a different path. The process can be
run repeatedly until all paths are explored, or until the tester
wishes to cease path exploration. Although we prioritize native
execution in TASE and mix concrete and symbolic execution,
our approach differs from concolic execution in that we do not
require entirely concrete inputs to drive symbolic execution.
We also do not require re-execution of a program from a new
set of concrete values to reach different execution paths, as
we employ native forking (see Sec. IV-E) to explore different
branches of program execution when control flow depends on
the value of a symbolic variable.
Rather than using a program’s native execution state as
its primary representation, the KLEE symbolic execution
engine [7] instead analyzes a program by interpreting its
source code translated to LLVM IR. KLEE is deeply opti-
mized to minimize the cost of constraint solving by caching
previous query results, applying normalization to constraints
and queries to facilitate comparisons between expressions,
and analyzing queries to determine subexpressions which may
have already been solved. KLEE is also structured to explore
multiple program paths within a single process. By doing
so, KLEE is able to closely guide state exploration with
heuristics chosen to prioritize code coverage or search for
specific bugs or problematic behavior. KLEE also implements
software based copy-on-write to more efficiently manage the
symbolic states associated with different program paths.
EXE [8], Mayhem [10], and S2E [14] are symbolic exe-
cution engines that use a program’s native state as its prin-
cipal representation. EXE analyzes a program by executing
it natively and checking each use of a variable against a
map that indicates if the variable is symbolic. Similarly,
Mayhem uses dynamic taint analysis [28] to detect instruction
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blocks that touch symbolic data, while otherwise executing
the program natively. EXE and Mayhem also use forking to
explore multiple execution paths, i.e., forking the symbolic-
execution process upon reaching a symbolic branch, to allow
the parent and child to explore the two possibilities separately.
S2E uses QEMU and KLEE together to mix concrete and
native execution, and is the system most similar to TASE.
S2E uses the virtualization and emulation tools within QEMU
to perform symbolic execution across user space and kernel
space boundaries [14]. S2E also uses an emulated MMU
that checks each byte during access in concrete execution
mode to determine if control must transfer to the KLEE-based
interpreter [13]. While we build on their techniques for sharing
symbolic and concrete state, TASE is built to prioritize and
optimize native execution using new transactional machine
instructions and symbolic-state detection mechanisms detailed
in Sec. IV. For detecting symbolic state, TASE does not
solely rely on the bitmap lookup techniques used in EXE and
S2E, and TASE incurs no virtualization or dynamic binary
translation overheads when executing code natively.
B. Intel TSX
Intel’s Transactional Synchronization Instructions (TSX)
were originally introduced to speed up concurrency in mul-
tithreaded applications [21, Ch. 16]. However, TSX instruc-
tions have been repurposed for security defenses (e.g., [32],
[11]) and attacks [39], [17], as well. Similarly, TASE uses
the transactions produced by TSX in an unorthodox way.
Specifically, TASE uses transactions to speculatively execute
regions of code natively during symbolic execution, aborting
the transaction if symbolic data is encountered. Key challenges
for implementing this strategy are presented in Sec. III-B.
III. BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES
Our work to optimize symbolic execution for latency-
sensitive applications required us to build on research from
seemingly unrelated topics. In this section we briefly cover
necessary background and key challenges that we address in
TASE, pertaining to executing concrete operations natively but
safely during symbolic execution (Sec. III-A) and leveraging
Intel TSX in this context (Sec. III-B).
A. Concrete Operations in Symbolic Execution
Past works (e.g., [19], [8], [14], [10]) have recognized the
significance of enabling native execution for entirely concrete
computations in symbolic execution engines. However, the
overwhelming amount of such concrete operations present in
some of our target applications necessitate more aggressive
optimizations in TASE. For example, in Chi et al.’s veri-
fication of OpenSSL traffic [12], which we explore as an
application of TASE in Sec. VI-B, fewer than 2.7% of instruc-
tions executed operate on symbolic data, even after extensive
protocol-specific optimizations to eliminate unnecessary con-
crete operations (described as the optimized configuration in
Sec. VI-B1). To enable inline operation of this verifier, it is
thus necessary that concrete operation be optimized as much
as possible.
To do so, TASE speculatively executes regions of code
natively within transactions, optimistically assuming that no
operation in the transaction reads or overwrites symbolic
values. Transactions are atomic, and if any operation in a trans-
action reads or overwrites a symbolic value, TASE must abort
the transaction and resume execution within an interpreter—
in our case, a modified version of the KLEE interpreter. After
the transaction completes within the interpreter, TASE resumes
native execution if possible.
Separating concrete and symbolic execution into different
execution modes provided challenges for safely handling the
symbolic expressions the interpreter produces. In particular,
TASE tracks symbolic values by tainting them, specifically by
augmenting KLEE’s concrete/symbolic bitmaps with poison
tainting and tracking. This required the design and verification
of invariants to guarantee that the transition between concrete
and symbolic execution does not unexpectedly overtaint or
undertaint the program’s execution with symbolic values,
invaliding the resulting analysis. Moreover, because execution
no longer occurs entirely within an interpreter, there is a
risk that native execution might overwrite previously symbolic
variables with concrete data with no indication to the inter-
preter, forcing us to adjust KLEE’s data structures to prevent
such updates.
B. Implementing Transactions with Intel TSX
A key contribution of our work is the use of Intel Trans-
actional Synchronization Instructions (TSX) to increase the
speed of symbolic execution. We focus specifically on the
use of the TSX Restricted Transactional Memory instructions
xbegin and xend.
Intel’s TSX instructions were originally released to provide
a hardware-assisted tool for managing concurrency in a pro-
cess. A thread thd may speculatively attempt to acquire a
shared resource by using an xbegin prior to entering the
critical section. xbegin starts a transaction in which any
modifications to memory or registers made by thd are either
entirely committed at the end of the transaction (signified by
xend) or entirely discarded, at which time control for thd may
transfer to a fallback path with simpler locking primitives (e.g.,
a spin lock). In other words, the transaction is atomic.
Should another thread thd′ attempt to enter the critical
section and modify the shared resource while thd is also
altering the resource in the transaction, one or both of the
transactions will abort and roll back [21, Ch. 16]. Transactions
are rolled back when conflicts over shared resources are
detected between the read and write sets of thd and thd′,
potentially allowing both threads to operate in the critical
section simultaneously if thd and thd′ do not read or write
the same shared data. Conflicts in the read/write sets of thd
and thd′ are detected by the cache coherence protocol, and en-
abling concurrency with TSX can potentially outperform other
locking methods which categorically prevent multiple threads
from executing in the critical section concurrently, even if
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no conflicting memory accesses would have occurred [21,
Ch. 16].
Intel’s transactional execution instructions provide the basis
for our speculative execution scheme. The application of the
transactions to create a fast path, while conceptually simple,
requires a large number of details to be addressed. First, as
noted by Shih et al. [32], forcing a program to execute entirely
within transactions introduces substantial challenges. Placing
each basic block from the program within a single transaction
introduces an overhead of roughly 8× native execution, and
transaction size is limited by cache size and associativity.
Further complicating matters, transactions may abort due to
asynchronous interrupts, are never guaranteed to commit, and
must be carefully started and committed to avoid nesting.
Second, our speculative native execution scheme requires
an efficient mechanism to abort transactions that encounter
symbolic data. Ideally, individual bytes containing symbolic
values could be marked as inaccessible by the OS (e.g., via
page permissions) or a low-level hardware mechanism (e.g.,
via debug registers) so as to force any transaction accessing
the byte to roll back. Unfortunately, the large granularity of
page-level permissions and the scarcity of debug registers
limit the effectiveness of these solutions. Another option is
to inject instrumentation into the program to query a lookup
table on each byte access (cf., [8]); however this approach
incurs a performance penalty for additional read operations
and compare operations, may clobber the FLAGS register
depending on its implementation, and also impacts the number
of operations that may be placed within a single transaction.
Sec. IV contains our approach for overcoming these chal-
lenges.
IV. DESIGN
In this section, we outline the design of TASE. We begin by
describing the overall architecture of TASE, and follow with
descriptions of the system’s transactional execution; its poison
checking scheme for detecting memory accesses of symbolic
values; its method of interpretation; and its mechanisms for
managing state exploration.
A. Structure of TASE
In TASE, we provide a symbolic execution system designed
to rapidly symbolically execute user-space programs with
small amounts of symbolic data. At its core, TASE provides a
“fast path” and “slow path” for handling concrete and symbolic
operations, respectively, as it executes an application (hence-
forth referred to as the project). Fig. 1 shows a simplified
overview of these two primary components.
TASE requires C source code to execute a project, including
source code for any C libraries the project will use. The “fast
path” for native execution described earlier is an instrumented,
binary x86 version of the project (and any libraries it uses)
produced by compiling the project’s source code with our
custom LLVM TASE compiler. Crucially, TASE executes
within this instrumented native execution path as the rule
rather than the exception. By instrumenting loads and stores
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Fig. 1: High-level structure of TASE. TASE comprises compo-
nents labeled “TASE Compiler” and “TASE IR Generation”.
TASE generates a project executable containing native and
interpretable representations of the project source, and that
switches between these representations through a code tram-
poline to which control flows after native execution of a project
basic block and after interpretation of a project basic block that
leaves no symbolic values in the emulated registers.
and inserting jumps to a code trampoline (cf., [25], [32]) with
transactional instructions around basic blocks, TASE enables
speculative native execution. TASE uses a poison (or sentinel)
value to mark bytes as containing symbolic values while
executing the project. While executing code natively within
a transaction, values read and overwritten are recorded and
checked en masse with SIMD instructions at the end of a
transaction. If the poison value was read or overwritten, the
transaction is aborted and all state changes performed during
the transaction are undone; details are provided in Sec. IV-B.
If TASE is unable to complete a transaction natively, control
transfers via a context switch from the trampoline to the “slow
path”, our KLEE-based interpreter. The interpreter is responsi-
ble for executing the target binary until another transactional
entry point is reached, at which time the target’s execution
might begin again concretely.
Context switching between the interpreter and native ex-
ecution in TASE closely resembles that in S2E [14]. The
interpreter and native execution share a common address
space, and a context switch from native execution to the
interpreter occurs by snapshotting the current state of the
general purpose registers (GPRs). The interpreter then uses
this snapshot to model each x86 instruction’s effects on main
memory and a simulated copy of the GPRs, which is restored
for concrete execution after a transactional boundary is reached
and symbolic values no longer reside within the GPRs.
Symbolic data—including values used for altering control
flow—are exclusively handled by the interpreter, which may
also fork state to explore new execution paths. Our forking
mechanism uses the native Unix fork system call to explore
execution paths, similar to the techniques used in EXE [8]; we
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include more details in Sec. IV-E. We discuss the mechanisms
for detecting usage of symbolic data during native execution
in Sec. IV-C.
B. Transactional Execution
In order to mitigate the cost of interpreting instructions with
concrete operands, TASE instead executes these instructions
natively within TSX transactions. Our strategy is to spec-
ulatively execute the target program natively for as many
transactions as possible, and abort a transaction if an “unsafe”
operation occurs that requires special handling of symbolic
data via interpretation. TASE requires access to source code,
and emits instrumented machine code for the program along
with the symbolic execution components and interpreter in a
single executable.
In a previous work that executed software in transactions
for a different purpose, T-SGX [32] uses the Clang LLVM
back-end to conservatively estimate the read and write sets of
instructions and cache-way usage at compile time to efficiently
group together a large number of instructions in a single TSX
transaction. Their technique helps to maximize the number
of instructions in a transaction to amortize the overhead
required for setting up and committing or rolling back a
transaction. Unlike T-SGX, TASE does not statically determine
the number of instructions to place in a transaction. Our
evaluation of OpenSSL verification (see Sec. VI-B) revealed
the need to efficiently instrument code that frequently included
variable-sized loops and function pointers, both of which make
effective compile-time instrumentation challenging. Using a
custom Clang LLVM back-end, TASE injects trampoline
jumps around basic blocks and dynamically determines the
boundaries for closing and opening a transaction at runtime.
For any transaction, let its stride denote the number of
basic blocks attempted within the transaction. In our present
implementation, we currently use a transactional batching
policy in which the stride of each transaction, by default, is
set to a constant smax; in our evaluation in Sec. VI, smax is
set to 16. If a transaction tx aborts, then one possibility would
be to trap to the interpreter and simply interpret through the
whole aborted transaction. However, a more refined approach
that leverages the reason for the abort can optimize execution
considerably.
If tx aborts due to reading or overwriting a poisoned
memory location (see Sec. IV-C), then tx is aborted using
an xabort instruction. This instruction permits information
about the abort to be conveyed to the abort handler in a
register. We use this facility to convey the number c of
basic blocks that were successfully executed in the transaction
(without detecting poison) before the one where poison was
encountered, which is tracked in a counter updated by the
trampoline. In this case, TASE attempts another transaction
tx′ beginning at the same place as tx, but with a stride of c.
If tx′ completes successfully, then the interpreter is invoked
to interpret through the next basic block (where poison is
known to appear), and native execution is resumed afterward,
if possible.
If tx aborts for another reason, then it is generally necessary
to interpret through the basic block where the abort occurred
(see [21, Sec. 16.3.8.2]). For example, if tx aborted due to
triggering a page fault, then it will likely trigger the page
fault again if retried in full [23]. TASE thus attempts to
natively execute as many of the basic blocks in tx as possible
while incurring few transaction aborts, before leveraging the
interpreter to interpret through the basic block that induced tx
to abort. TASE does this using the following logic (inspired
by binary search), assuming the stride of tx is smax:
1) s← smax/2.
2) While s ≥ smin do:
a) Attempt a transaction tx′ of s basic blocks.
b) s← s/2 (regardless of whether tx′ aborted and, if so,
the reason for the abort).
3) Trap to the interpreter and have it interpret through smin
basic blocks.
After step 3, TASE resumes native execution with its default
stride of smax. Note that each tx′ of stride s in step 2a
will either advance the program counter past the s blocks
attempted if tx′ does not abort, or will leave the program
counter unchanged if tx′ aborts. The logic above attempts to
ensure that if the condition that induced tx to abort is persistent
(e.g., a page fault incurred during a particular basic block),
then the troublesome basic block is interpreted in step 3.
C. Poison Checking
In order to prevent native transactions from interacting with
symbolic information in an “unsafe” way, we implement a
poison checking scheme. One such “unsafe” interaction we
prohibit is the loading of a symbolic variable into a register;
this allows us to assume that arithmetic performed within the
general purpose registers cannot access symbolic values and
therefore needs no additional instrumentation.
Broadly speaking, on a byte-level basis each memory loca-
tion that contains a symbolic value or expression is “poisoned”
with a reserved numeric value. Reads and writes within a
native transaction are instrumented at compile time to store
the values read and overwritten in reserved SIMD and general
purpose registers. At the end of each basic block and prior to a
transaction’s commitment, the values in the registers are tested
in bulk to determine if a poison value was read or overwritten.
If a poison value is found in the SIMD registers, the transaction
is aborted.
In order to make this scheme sound and efficient, several im-
plementation refinements were required. First, we implement
poisoning on an aligned two-byte basis. Byte-level poisoning
would potentially result in a large number of “false positives”
in which a native transaction reads a value concretely that, by
coincidence, matches the poison value. Consequently, if any
single byte b needs to be marked as symbolic by the interpreter,
we poison the 2-byte-aligned buffer B containing b. If B also
contains a concrete byte b′, then we mark b′ as symbolic as
well, but with a constraint that b′ equals its concrete value
prior to B’s poisoning. Of course, the risk of false positives
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could be reduced further by poisoning 4-byte buffers, though
we have found 2-byte poisoning to suffice so far.
Second, to prevent natively executing instructions that read
from or write to memory locations containing symbolic data,
we copy reads and memory values prior to writes to our
reserved SIMD and general purpose registers during native
execution. These read and overwritten values are later checked
at the end of the basic block to determine if an instruction
could have operated on symbolic data. If so, the transaction
rolls back and the interpreter handles the transaction, refer-
encing its internal bitmap indicator to determine if memory
operands are concrete or symbolic. Compared to instruction-
by-instruction instrumentation, batching poison checks at the
the end of the basic block in SIMD registers reduces the total
number of instructions required to perform the poison checks,
and simplifies the process of verifying that instrumentation
checks do not clobber the FLAGS register.
Third, to ensure that control flow within a transaction
containing one or more instructions operating on poisoned data
reaches the SIMD checks and aborts, we add additional instru-
mentation before indirect control flow instructions which allow
jumps to arbitrary destinations. Without such a safeguard, our
belated poison checking scheme could allow poison-dependent
indirect control flow arithmetic (e.g., jump table calculations
and function pointers) to erroneously transfer control to des-
tination addresses computed with the poison sentinel value,
thereby circumventing the poison checking logic. Specifically,
we add an additional trampoline jump to the poison checking
logic before instructions that jump to an operand address (e.g.,
call %rax, jmp %rax), effectively placing the instructions
in a separate basic block and preventing their execution if the
operand is symbolic; as stated earlier, control flow between
basic blocks traps to our interpreter if symbolic taint enters
a register. Similarly, if the indirect control flow instruction
performs a jump to an address stored in memory pointed to by
its operands (e.g., ret), we inject an additional poison check
for the destination address and a jump to the batched poison-
checking logic before the instruction is executed. Fortunately,
assuming access to the source code for target applications
in TASE and restricting our custom compiler’s instruction
selection simplifies the task of instrumenting indirect control
flow instructions.
The above design points help to ensure that native execution
does not interact with symbolic values in any way, including
“clobbering” writes to symbolic variables that would, in effect,
concretize them without notifying the interpreter. Our “in-
place” poison-checking scheme along with KLEE’s symbolic
bitmap indicator provides a mechanism for accomplishing this.
The design choices for our poisoning scheme were made
to minimize the cost of instrumentation. Whenever possible,
our instrumentation to save values read from or overwritten
in memory is inserted into the target code to prevent any
additional reads from or writes to memory. With the help
of alignment guarantees from the compiler, many instructions
reading data larger than a byte can be instrumented by moving
the data read from a general purpose register to a reserved reg-
ister, where it is later checked en masse with other data values.
Taint trackers such as Minemu [4] use similar techniques to
reserve SIMD registers for instrumentation purposes.
D. Interpretation
Should a native transaction encounter symbolic data, control
flow in TASE transfers to a KLEE-based interpreter. Given
the representation of the project as a set of x86 registers
and an address space, the interpreter executes instructions
until a transactional entry point is reached (i.e., an instruction
corresponding to the code trampoline) and the registers contain
no symbolic data. The interpreter tracks symbolic data on a
per-byte basis.
Invoking the interpreter requires saving a snapshot of the
GPRs as they appeared at the end of the last successful
transaction; crucially, TASE does not require that main mem-
ory is snapshotted or copied during the context switch. In
the interpreter, reads and writes to main memory are per-
formed directly on the addresses being read from or written
to. However, changes to the simulated x86 registers in the
interpreter must be faithfully tracked so that native execution
can be resumed by a context switch after interpretation has
completed. As KLEE interprets LLVM IR, we provide LLVM
IR representations of each x86 machine instruction within a
given transaction to preserve the semantics of the program
and produce a system state that may be restored for native
execution; see Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b for an example of how
the x86 instruction pop %r9 is modeled. In order to avoid
directly writing LLVM IR, our method for producing an
LLVM IR model for each x86 instructions is to write the state
changes performed by the instruction in C (as in Fig. 2a), and
use Clang (https://clang.llvm.org) to emit LLVM IR (as in
Fig. 2b). Note that the interpretation of pop %r9 in Fig. 2a
is modeled as the execution of a function. The function
takes a context containing a set of simulated general regis-
ters (greg_t * gregs), copies the value in main memory
pointed to by the simulated stack pointer to the interpreter’s
simulated register %r9 (line 2 in Fig. 2a), and increments the
simulated stack and instruction pointers (lines 3–4 in Fig. 2a).
Equivalent LLVM IR is provided in Fig. 2b. Note that the
offsets of the stack pointer, %r9, and the instruction pointer in
the greg_t * gregs struct are 15, 1, and 16 respectively.
The instructions on lines 2–6 retrieve the address pointed to
by our simulated stack pointer into temporary variable %2,
load the value at that address into %4, and store the result
into the interpreter’s model of %r9 in line 7. In line 5, our
interpreter directly reads from TASE’s virtual memory located
at the address specified our model of %r9 in the greg_t *
gregs struct; because of this, context switches between the
interpreter and native execution do not require expensive copy
operations for memory other than the saving and restoring of
our simulated registers. The instructions on lines 8–9 incre-
ment our simulated stack pointer and correspond to line 3
in Fig. 2a. Similarly, lines 10–13 increment the simulated
instruction pointer to point to the next opcode, as in line 4
of Fig. 2a.
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1 void interp_pop_r9 (greg_t* gregs) {
2 gregs[REG_R9] = *(greg_t*)gregs[REG_RSP];
3 gregs[REG_RSP] = gregs[REG_RSP] + 8;
4 gregs[REG_RIP] = gregs[REG_RIP] + 2;
5 }
(a) C model
1 define void @interp_pop_r9(i64* nocapture %gregs) #1 {
2 %1 = getelementptr inbounds i64* %gregs, i64 15
3 %2 = load i64* %1
4 %3 = inttoptr i64 %2 to i64*
5 %4 = load i64* %3
6 %5 = getelementptr inbounds i64* %gregs, i64 1
7 store i64 %4, i64* %5
8 %6 = add nsw i64 %2, 8
9 store i64 %6, i64* %1
10 %7 = getelementptr inbounds i64* %gregs, i64 16
11 %8 = load i64* %7
12 %9 = add nsw i64 %8, 2
13 store i64 %9, i64* %7
14 ret void
15 }
(b) LLVM IR model
Fig. 2: Models for interpreting pop %r9
While the example described above and pictured in Fig. 2 is
for a single instruction, TASE instead generates interpretable
models for entire basic blocks of the original project. We
elaborate further in Sec. V-A.
E. State Management
In addition to managing the transition between native execu-
tion and interpretation, TASE must also handle the exploration
of a potentially large number of execution paths. Handling
this “state explosion” problem is a crucial aspect of symbolic
execution, and has been a primary concern of many papers [9],
[7], [10], [13].
In TASE, multiple execution paths are explored in parallel
by using a native forking mechanism. Unlike other systems
that explore multiple execution states within a single address
space, TASE is unable to handle multiple execution states
concurrently within a single address space. Attempting to
explore states concurrently with multiple threads on one ad-
dress space could cause unintended transactional aborts when
threads access a common memory address.
Whenever the target program encounters a control flow
instruction (e.g., a jmp or branch) that depends on a symbolic
variable, execution must revert to the interpreter. After the
interpreter takes control, execution states are created corre-
sponding to the different possible destinations of the control
flow instruction, and the fork system call is invoked. The
resulting two processes extend the current execution in cases
that the branch condition is true or false, respectively. We ad-
dress indirect control-flow transfers dependent on a symbolic
variable by producing an execution state for each possible
destination. EXE [8] uses a similar mechanism to handle state
exploration, and in both TASE and EXE this approach provides
the benefit of hardware-based copy-on-write to mitigate the
cost of creating new processes. Both EXE and TASE also
have at least some cases in which state exploration and
path prioritization require child processes to halt and wait
for a central state management process to authorize further
execution. This potentially introduces bottlenecks when many
child processes are exploring a large state space; however the
centralization of state management in a single process helps to
prevent “fork bombing” issues in which the machine hosting
TASE is overwhelmed with too many processes.
Forcing each process following a fork to signal back to
the central management process allows a variety of search
heuristics to be implemented by the central coordinator. We
intend to explore the use of simple heuristics, such as breadth-
first and depth-first search, as well as ones tailored to particular
applications. For example, in prior research on client behavior
verification, Cochran et al. [15] leveraged the next message
inbound from the client to prioritize the order in which paths
were explored to identify a path consistent with that message
having been sent next by the client. This prioritization was
based on data collected from the client program during a
training phase. In this approach, when a path search reaches a
symbolic branch, the central coordinator determines which of
the currently paused processes—i.e., either the two resulting
from this fork, or another one—is on a path that is “closest”
to one that, in training, could typically be used to “explain” the
latest message received from the client. That process would
then be signaled to continue its search until reaching the
next symbolic branch. Of course, this prioritization is only
an example strategy, and we intend to explore others, as well.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we briefly discuss implementation details of
TASE.
A. IR Generation
Like other symbolic execution engines, TASE requires an
intermediate representation of code to perform symbolic exe-
cution. Specifically, TASE uses LLVM IR to model each x86
instruction that potentially touches symbolic data, as discussed
in Sec. IV-D.
Crucially, unlike some other symbolic execution tools,
TASE requires access to source code, from which TASE
produces an instrumented executable using a custom compiler.
Controlling the compiler allows us to selectively limit the
pool of instructions available to the LLVM backend’s code-
generation algorithms. This drastically simplifies the laborious
task of producing IR models for x86 instructions, at the cost
of requiring source code.
Additionally, we use information provided by the LLVM
backend during compilation to record FLAGS-register liveness
information around basic blocks, which we use to periodically
kill the FLAGS register. This benefits our execution in TASE
because it reduces the overall amount of symbolic data the
interpreter must handle, and, in certain situations, allows the
interpreter to more quickly produce a fully concrete copy of
its simulated GPRs needed to return to native execution.
Because execution within a basic block in TASE must occur
either entirely in the interpreter or natively for the duration
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of the basic block, we employ an additional optimization
to speed up interpretation. We “batch” the IR for all x86
instructions in a basic block together and invoke the interpreter
to interpret whole basic block at once, rather than doing so
per instruction within the basic block. In practice, we observe
that this optimization reduces the total size of the LLVM
interpretation bitcode by a factor of roughly three. Assuming
access to source and control over the compiler also helps here;
by disabling the selection of instructions that modify certain
flags bits (e.g., the direction flag used by string-manipulation
instructions), the overall size of the IR is reduced and more
opportunities to omit redundant flags computations appear.
Moreover, we found that reducing instruction selection based
on flags usage offered opportunities to completely kill flags
in certain cases after control flow instructions were used,
reducing the likelihood of expressions “snowballing” together
due to flags computations being continuously OR’d together.
B. Forking and Path Exploration
As noted in Sec. IV-E, we employ a native Unix fork call
to explore multiple execution states in TASE when execution
encounters a symbolic branch. Execution in TASE begins with
a central “manager” process forking off a child process to
begin path exploration of the project’s code. The manager
uses signal-based job-control mechanisms, shared memory,
and system-level semaphores to steer and control execution
through different branches as a pre-defined maximum number
of worker processes execute in parallel. If a worker encounters
a symbolic branch, it halts execution until the manager process
determines what course of action to take. Although path
selection and code coverage is vital for general symbolic
execution, we leave these for future work and instead focus
on optimizing workloads with low levels of symbolic taint.
Native forking in TASE benefits from hardware-based copy-
on-write, but still incurs overhead; among other things, the
Linux kernel copies the parent process’ page table entries
for the child [18]. To reduce this cost, our experiments in
TASE use the Linux transparent huge pages feature to reduce
the size of page table mappings without explicitly modifying
the applications. The daemon used by the kernel to coalesce
small (4KB) pages into huge (2MB) pages periodically runs
at a predefined interval; we experimentally determined that
10ms appeared roughly optimal for our behavioral verification
application in Sec. VI-B.
C. Transaction Sizing
As discussed in Sec. IV-B, the stride of a transaction in
TASE is set to a constant smax by default; after executing
smax basic blocks, the transaction will be closed. A value smax
that is too small will hurt performance by closing transactions
more frequently than necessary, whereas a value that is too
large can incur a substantial performance penalty when a
transaction aborts, since all the work it performed will be
thrown away. To maximize performance, smax would ideally
be tuned per project and per platform, since the size of the
L1 data cache limits the amount of data that a transaction
Microbenchmark Native TASE S2E KLEE
BigNum addition (10MB) 0.064s 0.756s 2.907s 182.747
sha256 (44MB) 0.210s 1.825s 3.850s 528.718s
md5sum (44MB) 0.125s 1.619s 9.599s 1276.700s
TABLE I: Overhead on concrete computations. All times in
seconds. BigNum addition was performed byte-by-byte on two
10MB integers. Hashes were computed on a 44MB file.
can read or write and since the frequency at which symbolic
data is accessed may vary depending on the application. In the
future, we plan to explore dynamically adjusting smax based on
runtime conditions, as well. For the purposes of our evaluation
in Sec. VI, we simply set smax = 16.
Because the basic block is the smallest granularity at which
transaction size can be controlled in TASE, it is also necessary
that basic blocks be limited to a maximum size. In our present
implementation, basic blocks are limited to 50 instructions.
Here again, the limit of 50 was chosen experimentally; we
plan to explore methods in future work to automatically tune
this constant.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section we measure TASE’s performance. We first
detail TASE’s performance in a series of microbenchmarks in
Sec. VI-A, and then we consider an application of symbolic
execution to validating the messaging behavior of a software
client in Sec. VI-B. All performance experiments described in
this section were conducted on a computer with a 3.5GHz
Intel Xeon CPU E3-1240 v5 processor and 64GB of RAM.
A. Microbenchmarks
In this section we report the results of various microbench-
marks to compare TASE to alternatives when executing on
mostly concrete workloads—the contexts for which TASE
was designed. Our first microbenchmark evaluations compared
TASE to native execution and execution by S2E and KLEE,2
for three programs: the first adds two concrete 10MB integers
byte-by-byte with a one-byte carry, and the second and third
are sha2563 and md5sum4, each applied to a concrete 44MB
file. These programs were compiled using Clang 7.1.0 with O2
optimization for the native and S2E targets, and with Clang
6.0.1 with O2 optimization for KLEE (as 6.0.1 was the Clang
version included with KLEE). In contrast, TASE supports only
a limited version of O1 optimization at the time of this writing.
The results of these executions are shown in Table I. TASE
was up to 13× slower than native execution on these bench-
mark programs. However, S2E was up to 77× slower, and
KLEE incurred overheads up to 104× native execution.
TASE is tailored to executing projects with small amounts
of symbolic data, and so increasing the amount of symbolic
2We used Dockerized KLEE built from a container retrieved on Oct 23,
2019 (https://klee.github.io/docker/) and S2E retrieved on July 11, 2019 (https:
//github.com/s2e/s2e-env.git).
3https://github.com/coreutils/gnulib/blob/master/lib/sha256.c
4https://github.com/kfl/mosml/blob/master/src/runtime/md5sum.c
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Fig. 3: Average time to add two 50KB integers vs. index of
first symbolic byte, for TASE (•), KLEE (N), and S2E ().
A higher index for the first symbolic byte indicates a higher
fraction of concrete operations. Each point is an average over
five runs, with relative standard deviation < 6%.
data does impact its performance. Fig. 3 shows the perfor-
mance of byte-by-byte BigNum addition using the same code
represented in Table I (but only 50KB operands), but with
some byte marked symbolic. Once this byte is encountered,
the carry byte becomes symbolic and remains so for the rest
of the computation; as such, the bytes of the sum tainted by
the symbolic carry byte are symbolic, as well. This symbolic
data did not affect the performance of the BigNum addition in
KLEE (Fig. 3), since KLEE interprets all project instructions.
The performance of the BigNum addition in TASE, however,
decayed as the first symbolic byte was encountered earlier in
the computation; only once ≈ 80% of the BigNum addition
was performed concretely does TASE outperform KLEE. The
primary reason for the loss of performance for larger amounts
of symbolic data is that TASE interprets substantially more
LLVM IR instructions to model a restorable context for na-
tive execution (see Sec. VII-B). In particular, TASE executed
almost 8× as many IR instructions as KLEE in the BigNum
addition test when the index of the first symbolic byte was
set to zero. S2E exhibited similar trends as TASE, eventually
becoming faster than KLEE; however, its performance was
much worse than TASE in this test, and became faster than
KLEE only once > 95% of the BigNum addition was concrete.
B. Client Verification with TASE
The second evaluation for TASE that we report is its use in
a framework for verifying client behavior in client-server pro-
tocols [12]. Numerous server exploits take the form of a client
sending messages to a server that no legitimate or sanctioned
client would send; e.g., Chi et al. observed that several notable
TLS exploits (e.g., Heartbleed, CVE-2014-0160) are of this
form. To determine whether or not a client message could have
originated from an unmodified client TLS implementation, Chi
et al. detail a technique for symbolically executing OpenSSL’s
s_client and then solving to determine whether there exist
inputs that could have caused that implementation to produce
the message sequence received. A message sequence for which
no inputs can be found to produce it indicates that the message
sequence is inconsistent with the claimed software client and
so might represent an exploit. The Chi et al. framework is an
extension of similar tools (e.g., [3], [15]) adapted specifically
for cryptographic protocols like TLS: it leverages knowledge
of the TLS session key and symbolically executes the client
in multiple passes, skipping specified prohibitive functions
(the AES block cipher and hash functions) until constraints
generated from observed client-to-server messages could fully
concretize their inputs.
This defense benefits from its generality (it needs no fore-
knowledge of a vulnerability or exploit to detect an attack)
and soundness, in the sense that if it accepts a sequence of
messages, then there are inputs that could have caused the
legitimate client to produce that sequence. However, to be
used as an inline defense, it requires symbolic execution to
keep pace with the arrival of messages. Below we compare
verification speeds using TASE against the KLEE-based im-
plementation originally produced by Chi et al., to which we
refer here as CliVer (for simply “client verification”). We show
not only that TASE significantly improves performance, but
that it does so to an extent that permits this defense to reside
on the critical path of message processing for all but the most
latency-sensitive TLS applications.
The only changes we made to the CliVer tool for this
evaluation was to implement the following two optimizations
for it, to make the comparison to TASE fairer since TASE
incorporates analogous optimizations. First, we changed how
CliVer models the select system call, so that its return value
indicates that stddout is always available (versus being
symbolic). s_client writes the application payload received
from the server to stddout, and so blocks if stddout is
unavailable. As such, this change has no effect on the message
sequence that could be received from s_client; i.e., any
message sequence received in an execution where stddout
becomes unavailable is a prefix of a sequence that could be
received in an execution where it remains available throughout.
This change does, however, relieve CliVer from needing to
explore the execution path in s_client where stddout is
unavailable, saving it the expense of doing so.
Second, when CliVer is seeking to verify message i from the
client and reaches a send point when symbolically executing
s_client, it must create and solve constraints reflecting
message i and the path executed to reach that send point.
This produces an unusually large number of relatively simple
equality constraints (i.e., one constraint per each byte of the
message), many of which contain a large number of XOR
operations due to the choice of cipher suite. To more efficiently
move the constraint information between the interpreter and its
solver, we alter the behavior of KLEE’s independent constraint
solver to send all constraints en masse rather than one-by-
one. Moreover, though the SAT solver we use supports XOR
expressions [34], we found it much more efficient to rewrite
these expressions to remove XORs before sending them to the
solver. This optimization improves the performance of CliVer
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considerably, and we leverage it in TASE, as well.
1) Experiment setup: Our evaluation used the same TLS
1.2 dataset used by Chi et al. [12]. This dataset includes
benign traffic captured by tcpdump during a Gmail browsing
session, and maliciously crafted Heartbleed packets to simulate
CVE-2014-0160. The Gmail data set was generated by sending
and receiving emails with attachments in Firefox over a span
of approximately 3 minutes, and included 21 independent,
concurrent TLS sessions for a total of 3.8MB of data.
We compared TASE with CliVer in two configurations. The
first presumes minimal protocol-specific knowledge or thus
adaptation by the party deploying the verifier. In this basic
configuration, each tool was provided a specification of the
same prohibitive functions, but otherwise the tool operated
on the Gmail trace unmodified. Even in this configuration,
however, we provided CliVer with native implementations of
these prohibitive functions, so that even once their inputs had
been concretized, they would be executed natively (versus be-
ing interpreted), thus rendering our comparison conservative.
The second, optimized configuration incorporated a range of
protocol-specific optimizations. In particular, after the TLS 1.2
handshake, client-to-server and server-to-client messages are
independent of one another, and so server-to-client messages
were ignored when verifying the client-to-server messages. In
addition, certificate verification was elided, since the verifier,
being deployed to protect the server, trusts the server to send
a valid certificate chain.
2) Results: When used as an inline defense against mali-
cious traffic, the speed to reach a true detection is arguably a
secondary concern; the delay imposed on attack traffic might
be viewed more as a benefit than a detriment. Nevertheless,
we used synthetic Heartbleed packets to confirm that TASE
could determine these packets were not consistent with the
OpenSSL TLS client in only 178ms from the initiation of the
connection (i.e., including the TLS handshake).
More critical is the delay that TASE would impose on legit-
imate traffic. Here we report the cost and lag of verification as
defined by Chi et al. For the i-th message in a TLS session,
cost(i) is the processing time required to verify message i
beginning from the symbolic state produced from verifying
through message i−1. lag(i) is the delay between the receipt
of message i and when its verification completes. Note that
lag(i) ≥ cost(i), and lag(i) > cost(i) if when message i is
received by the verifier, the verification of message i−1 is not
yet complete (and so verifying message i cannot yet begin).
Table II gives coarse statistics for the cost and lag of
verifying all 21 TLS sessions in the Gmail trace, in the basic
(left) and optimized (right) configurations. Interestingly, the
median costs for TASE and CliVer were very similar, but the
median lag for CliVer was up to 18× larger (in the optimized
configuration) than it was for TASE. The cause was the
messages that were most costly to verify, with costs in CliVer
roughly 12× that in TASE in the optimized configuration (and
roughly 15× that in TASE in the basic configuration). These
greater costs caused the lag to accumulate at various points
in the trace, inducing an average CliVer lag on the optimized
Configuration basic optimized
System TASE CliVer TASE CliVer
Average cost 0.009s 0.033s 0.027s 0.070s
Median cost 0.007s 0.006s 0.022s 0.018s
Max cost 0.142s 2.116s 0.107s 1.274s
Average lag 1.739s 4.654s 0.219s 1.138s
Median lag 0.606s 4.720s 0.066s 1.195s
Max lag 8.219s 17.880s 1.787s 4.210s
TABLE II: Statistics for verification of benign Gmail traces
configuration of > 1s and a maximum lag of > 4s. In contrast,
the TASE lag averaged only ≈ 0.2s and incurred a maximum
lag for any message of < 2s. For a driving application like
Gmail that is paced by human activity, these lags may well be
small enough to support the use of TASE as an inline defense.
A temporal view of the lag is pictured in Fig. 4, which
shows the distribution of lag across all 21 TLS sessions with
messages binned according to their arrival times, where arr(i)
denotes the arrival time of message i; for example, the first bin
contains the messages that arrived within the first 30s of each
of the 21 TLS sessions. Arrival time is measured relative to
the start of the individual TLS session. Within each bin, a box-
and-whisker plot shows the first, second, and third quartiles,
with the whiskers extended to 1.5× the interquartile range.
The average is shown as a diamond, and outliers appear as
individual points.
The lags for the basic deployment lacking protocol-specific
optimizations are shown in Fig. 4a, and the lags for the opti-
mized deployment leveraging protocol-specific optimizations
are shown in Fig. 4b. Both TASE and CliVer suffered lag
in the first 30s of each connection, though TASE’ median
lag in this interval was ≈ 20% of CliVer’s in the basic
configuration, and even less in the optimized configuration.
Indeed, the 75th percentile of CliVer’s lag in this first 30s
exceeded essentially all lags induced by TASE in the same
interval. By the end of the first 30s, both tools “caught
up” and maintained lags capable of sustaining interactive use
until about 90s into the traces; at this point, large server-to-
client transfers caused CliVer to lag considerably in the basic
configuration, while TASE was able to better keep up. These
lags were smaller in the optimized configuration, since server-
to-client data messages were ignored.
In Fig. 5 we report the cost for verifying each message
in these connections as a function of the message’s size.
The datapoints in Fig. 5 represent all 21 TLS sessions in
the Gmail dataset but, in the case of CliVer, omit points for
the ClientHello message and selected handshake messages of
each TLS connection. These messages were omitted because
CliVer’s excessive verification costs for them skewed the
y-axis range considerably, rendering the other trends more
difficult to distinguish visually. (All messages are included
in the TASE datapoints, however.) Fig. 5a represents the costs
in the basic configuration, and Fig. 5b shows the costs in the
optimized configuration. As can be seen in Fig. 5b, the costs
for most messages scaled linearly in message size for both
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Fig. 4: Verification lag for 21 TLS sessions in the Gmail
trace. The box plot at arrival time t includes {lag(i) : t ≤
arr(i) < t + 30s} across all 21 TLS sessions. Fig. 4a shows
lag in verifying the Gmail traces using TASE and CliVer in
a basic deployment without protocol-specific optimizations,
and Fig. 4b shows lag in a configuration with optimizations
leveraging protocol knowledge; see Sec. VI-B1.
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Fig. 5: Verification cost vs. message size
TASE and CliVer, but the slope of this growth was flatter
with TASE, resulting in lower costs (and so less lag) for
verification. In Fig. 5a, the datapoints for TASE fell along
two lines corresponding to the client-to-server and server-to-
client messages (the latter are mostly omitted from Fig. 5b),
and similarly for the datapoints for CliVer.
VII. LIMITATIONS
In this section we discuss several limitations of TASE.
A. Equivalence of Interpretation and Native Execution
Inevitable differences between the behaviors of native exe-
cution and interpretation of the same project imply that TASE
results are not necessarily semantically equivalent to those
obtained using symbolic execution based on interpretation
only. For example, KLEE detects out-of-bounds accesses to
concrete buffers, while native execution (without additional
instrumentation) does not. It would seem that differences in
the results of applying KLEE and TASE to a project could
arise, however, only due to the project’s processing on concrete
values, since processing on symbolic values would trigger
interpretation in TASE, as well.
In the context of the client verification application discussed
in Sec. VI-B, this means that those behaviors permitted by
CliVer, which uses KLEE to interpret the client program in
full, are not identical to those permitted by TASE. However, a
behavior permitted by TASE but not by CliVer, if caused by an
input validation error of the client program, would presumably
need to be an artifact of server-to-client messages, which are
concrete to the verifier. Since the verifier is deployed to defend
the server and is trusted to cooperate with it, malicious server-
to-client messages are outside the scope of those techniques.
B. Interpreting x86 Instructions
Although the use of native state as the primary representa-
tion for program execution in TASE introduces opportunities
for speculative native execution on concrete data, this design
choice also introduces some difficulties.
Because KLEE requires LLVM IR to perform symbolic
execution, we needed to produce LLVM IR models for the
effects of each x86 instruction to be interpreted by KLEE on
the program’s state. In addition to providing a burdensome
engineering challenge, we found (as did S2E’s authors [14])
that modeling a given x86 instruction’s impact on program
state using the RISC-like LLVM IR required several LLVM
IR instructions to fully capture all side effects, including the
changes to the FLAGS register.
As a result, a machine-independent interpretation of a
source program in vanilla KLEE could require fewer LLVM
IR instructions to model the program’s execution than in
TASE. We feel that our use cases contain a sufficiently large
usage of concrete data to justify the optimizations for native
execution in TASE, but a tradeoff nevertheless exists between
the additional instructions needed for interpretation in TASE
and the speed gained in native execution.
C. Instrumentation
In order to ensure that reads or writes to memory addresses
containing symbolic values are accurately recorded, TASE
uses a custom LLVM backend to emit and instrument code.
Although LLVM provides many utilities for writing compiler
passes to analyze or modify machine code as it is emitted,
significant engineering challenges must still be overcome to
ensure that all code emitted for TASE is properly instru-
mented. Specifically, the large number and variety of x86
instructions available combined with their side effects and
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implicit operands make it difficult to write a catch-all compiler
pass that determines how an instruction touches memory.
Furthermore, determining exactly where in the LLVM backend
to inject instrumentation can be nontrivial, given that LLVM
applies a large number of stages of optimization, some of
which may modify code emitted earlier during compilation.
To simplify the instrumentation process, TASE’s LLVM
backend restricts the pool of x86 instructions available to the
compiler during instruction selection. Our anecdotal evidence
suggests that the slowdown imposed by choosing from a
more limited set of instructions is negligible compared to
the overhead of setting up and committing transactions and
periodically interpreting when needed, but we may expand the
set of allowed instructions in the future.
D. Controlled Forking
TASE was designed to use native forking to explore differ-
ent execution paths, each in a different process, in order to
avoid the overhead of software-based copy-on-write mecha-
nisms as used in KLEE and S2E [7], [14]. Although forking
allows TASE to explore distinct paths in parallel, exploring
distinct execution paths within distinct address spaces compli-
cates the process of applying search heuristics across these
many processes, sharing cached SMT query results across
paths, etc. Furthermore, even if it were desirable to move all or
some aspects of path exploration into a single address space,
the TSX transactions utilized for our speculative execution
scheme would likely abort more often due to their origi-
nal intended use—detecting conflicting concurrent accesses—
thereby impinging on performance.
As discussed in Sec. IV-E, our present implementation
leverages a central manager process to guide path exploration,
which it does simply by prioritizing which worker processes it
allows to proceed (and temporarily suspending others). Some
applications might require more sophisticated mechanisms for
state management in which this simple prioritization is insuf-
ficient. For example, hybrid symbolic execution as introduced
in Mayhem [10], in which symbolic states can be archived
to relieve memory pressure and restored later for further
exploration, might be needed for analyzing some types of
applications efficiently.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the design, implementation,
and evaluation of TASE. To our knowledge, TASE is the
first symbolic execution engine that leverages specialized
hardware capabilities to accelerate native execution to optimize
workloads in which operations on concrete data are a major
bottleneck. The two technical innovations in TASE to make
this possible are (i) batching tests to detect native accesses
to symbolic data into a few instructions, and (ii) undoing the
potentially erroneous effects of having accessed symbolic data
natively by leveraging hardware transactions.
We illustrated an application of TASE for verifying whether
the messaging behavior of a client as seen by the server is con-
sistent with the software the client is believed to be executing.
We showed that the use of TASE in this application dramati-
cally reduced the lag associated with verifying OpenSSL TLS
1.2 traffic, e.g., as driven by Gmail. This reduction bolsters
the prospects of deploying this verification on the critical
path of delivering client messages to the server, as an inline
defense against client exploits without foreknowledge of server
vulnerabilities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported in part by grant N00014-17-1-
2369 from the U.S. Office of Naval Research.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Anand, P. Godefroid, and N. Tillmann, “Demand-driven composi-
tional symbolic execution,” in 14th International Conference on Tools
and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, ser. LNCS,
Mar. 2008, vol. 4963, pp. 367–381.
[2] F. Bellard, “QEMU, a fast and portable dynamic translator,” in USENIX
Annual Technical Conference, FREENIX Track, Apr. 2005, pp. 41–46.
[3] D. Bethea, R. A. Cochran, and M. K. Reiter, “Server-side verification
of client behavior in online games,” ACM Transactions on Information
and System Security, vol. 14, Dec. 4.
[4] E. Bosman, A. Slowinska, and H. Bos, “Minemu: The world’s fastest
taint tracker,” in Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 14th Interna-
tional Symposium, ser. LNCS, vol. 6961, Sep. 2011, pp. 1–20.
[5] R. S. Boyer, B. Elspas, and K. N. Levitt, “SELECT – a formal system for
testing and debugging programs by symbolic execution,” in International
Conference on Reliable Software, 1975, pp. 234–245.
[6] D. Brumley, J. Newsome, D. Song, H. Wang, and S. Jha, “Towards auto-
matic generation of vulnerability-based signatures,” in IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, May 2006.
[7] C. Cadar, D. Dunbar, and D. Engler, “KLEE: Unassisted and automatic
generation of high-coverage tests for complex systems programs,” in 8th
USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation,
Dec. 2008.
[8] C. Cadar, V. Ganesh, P. M. Pawlowski, D. L. Dill, and D. R. Engler,
“EXE: Automatically generating inputs of death,” in ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, Oct. 2006.
[9] C. Cadar and K. Sen, “Symbolic execution for software testing: Three
decades later,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 82–90,
Feb. 2013.
[10] S. K. Cha, T. Avgerinos, A. Rebert, and D. Brumley, “Unleashing
Mayhem on binary code,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
May 2012, pp. 380–394.
[11] S. Chen, X. Zhang, M. K. Reiter, and Y. Zhang, “Detecting privileged
side-channel attacks in shielded execution with De´ja` Vu,” in 12th ACM
Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Apr. 2017,
pp. 7–18.
[12] A. Chi, R. A. Cochran, M. Nesfield, M. K. Reiter, and C. Sturton, “A
system to verify network behavior of known cryptographic clients,” in
14th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implemen-
tation, Mar. 2017, p. 177–195.
[13] V. Chipounov, V. Kunetsov, and G. Candea, “The S2E platform: Design,
implementation, and applications,” ACM Transactions on Computer
Systems, vol. 30, no. 1, Feb. 2012.
[14] V. Chipounov, V. Kuznetsov, and G. Candea, “S2E: A platform for
in-vivo multi-path analysis of software systems,” in 16th International
Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and
Operating Systems, 2011, pp. 265–278.
[15] R. A. Cochran and M. K. Reiter, “Toward online verification of
client behavior in distributed applications,” in 20th ISOC Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium, Feb. 2013.
[16] M. Costa, M. Castro, L. Zhou, L. Zhang, and M. Peinado, “Bouncer:
securing software by blocking bad input,” in 21st ACM Symposium on
Operating Systems Principles, Oct. 2007.
[17] C. Disselkoen, D. Kohlbrenner, L. Porter, and D. Tullsen,
“PRIME+ABORT: A timer-free high-precision L3 cache attack
using Intel TSX,” in 26th USENIX Security Symposium, 2007, pp.
51–67.
12
[18] “fork(2),” in Linux Programmer’s Manual, 15 Sep. 2017, http://man7.
org/linux/man-pages/man2/fork.2.html.
[19] P. Godefroid, N. Klarlund, and K. Sen, “DART: Directed automated
random testing,” in ACM Conference on Programming Language Design
and Implementation, Jun. 2005, pp. 213–223.
[20] P. Godefroid, M. Leving, and D. Molnar, “SAGE: Whitebox fuzzing for
security testing,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 40–44.
[21] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual, Intel,
Oct. 2019.
[22] J. C. King, “Symbolic execution and program testing,” Communications
of the ACM, vol. 19, no. 7, pp. 385–394, 1976.
[23] A. Kleen, “TSX anti patterns in lock elision code,” https://software.intel.
com/en-us/articles/tsx-anti-patterns-in-lock-elision-code, 26 Mar. 2014.
[24] C. Kruegel, E. Kirda, D. Mutz, W. Robertson, and G. Vigna, “Au-
tomating mimicry attacks using static binary analysis,” in 14th USENIX
Security Symposium, Jul. 2005, pp. 161–176.
[25] C.-K. Luk, R. Cohn, R. Muth, H. Patil, A. Klauser, G. Lowney,
S. Wallace, V. J. Reddi, and K. Hazelwood, “Pin: Building customized
program analysis tools with dynamic instrumentation,” in 26th ACM
Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, Jun.
2005.
[26] D. Milushev, W. Beck, and D. Clarke, “Noninterference via symbolic
execution,” in Formal Techniques for Distributed Systems, 2012.
[27] D. Monniaux, “A survey of satisfiability modulo theory,” in 18th Inter-
national Workshop on Computer Algebra in Scientific Computing, ser.
LNCS, vol. 9890, 2016, pp. 401–425.
[28] J. Newsome and D. Song, “Dynamic taint analysis for automatic
detection, analysis, and signature generation of exploits on commodity
software,” in ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium,
Feb. 2005.
[29] C. S. Pa˘sa˘reanu, P. Mehlitz, D. Bushnell, K. Gundy-Burlet, M. Lowry,
S. Person, and M. Pape, “Combining unit-level symbolic execution
and system-level concrete execution for testing NASA software,” in
International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis, Jul. 2008,
pp. 15–26.
[30] C. S. Pa˘sa˘reanu, Q. S. Phan, and P. Malacaria, “Multi-run side-channel
analysis using symbolic execution and max-SMT,” in 29th IEEE Com-
puter Security Foundations Symposium, 2016, pp. 387–400.
[31] K. Sen, D. Marinov, and G. Agha, “CUTE: A concolic unit testing
engine for C,” in 13th International Symposium on the Foundations of
Software Engineering, Sep. 2005.
[32] M.-W. Shih, S. Lee, T. Kim, and M. Peinado, “T-SGX: Eradicating
controlled-channel attacks against enclave programs,” in ISOC Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium, Feb. 2017.
[33] Y. Shoshitaishvili, R. Wang, C. Hauser, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna,
“Firmalice – automatic detection of authentication bypass vulnerabilities
in binary firmware,” in ISOC Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium, Feb. 2015.
[34] M. Soos, K. Nohl, and C. Castelluccia, “Extending SAT solvers to
cryptographic problems,” in 12th International Conference on Theory
and Applications of Satisfiability Testing, ser. LNCS, vol. 5584, 2009,
pp. 244–257.
[35] N. Tillmann and J. D. Halleux, “Pex: White box test generation for
.NET,” in 2nd International Conference on Tests and Proofs, 2008, pp.
134–153.
[36] W. Visser, C. S. Pa˘sa˘reanu, and S. Khurshid, “Test input generation
with Java PathFinder,” SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, vol. 29,
pp. 97–107, Jul. 2004.
[37] R. Wang, X. Wang, Z. Li, H. Tang, M. K. Reiter, and Z. Dong, “Privacy-
preserving genomic computation through program specialization,” in
16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Nov.
2009.
[38] J. Yang, C. Sar, P. Twohey, C. Cadar, and D. Engler, “Automatically gen-
erating malicious disks using symbolic execution,” in IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, May 2006.
[39] J. Yeongjin, S. Lee, and T. Kim, “Breaking kernel address space layout
randomization with Intel TSX,” in ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, 2016, pp. 380–392.
[40] D. Yuan, H. Mai, W. Xiong, L. Tan, Y. Zhou, and S. Pasupathy, “Sher-
Log: Error diagnosis by connecting clues from run-time logs,” in 15th
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming
Languages and Operating Systems, Mar. 2010, pp. 143–154.
[41] I. Yun, S. Lee, M. Xu, Y. Jang, and T. Kim, “QSYM: A practical concolic
execution engine tailored for hybrid fuzzing,” in 27th USENIX Security
Symposium, Aug. 2018.
[42] C. Zamfir and G. Candea, “Execution synthesis: A technique for auto-
mated software debugging,” in 5th European Conference on Computer
Systems, Apr. 2010, pp. 321–334.
[43] Z. Zhou, Z. Qian, M. K. Reiter, and Y. Zhang, “Static evaluation
of noninterference using approximate model counting,” in 39th IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2018, pp. 514–528.
13
